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Saudi Arabia as a Resurgent Regional Power 
Anoushiravan Ehteshami 
 
Abstract 
For a prolonged period since the 1980s the MENA subsystem has been weakening under the 
weight of persistent inter-state conflict, violent non-state and sub-state actor incursions, 
and intense competition for influence and geopolitical advantage amongst its core states. 
Further, a domino of regime collapses across the Arab region since 2010 has heralded an 
unprecedented level of disorder, insecurity and chaos in the period following the rapid fall 
of several Arab autocrats. Regional disorder and the general crisis of the state in the Arab 
region has aggravated regional fragmentation and has at the same time emboldened Saudi 
Arabia and a small group of its neighbours to adopt a more interventionist, and at times 
belligerent foreign policy posture. Applying a complex realist approach, this paper traces the 
impact of the region’s changing dynamics on Saudi Arabia and argues that the Kingdom’s 
changing of the guard in 2015 has led to an intensification of Saudi activism and a deepening 
of its role as a resurgent regional power.  
 
Introduction: MENA regional system 
The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region is, in the emerging post-bipolar order, 
arguably the most strategically significant subsystem of the international system. Interstate 
relations in this subsystem are so intense and dynamic that many of these interactions end 
up having a significant impact on the wider international system. Further, the consequences 
of exercise of power, or loss of power, in this region tend to make a significant impression 
not only on the policies of the great (the United States) and major (the European Union, 
Russia, China, India, Japan) powers, but also on the diplomatic energies running through the 
veins of the myriad of inter-governmental organizations entrusted with managing and 
minimizing global insecurity. A brief glance at the agenda of the UN Security Council (the 
highest international body focusing on international peace and security), for example, will 
show that activities undertaken by the Council between 2010-2017 on the MENA region 
(including Afghanistan and Somalia), in terms of resolutions composed and adopted, far 
outweighed those focusing on other parts of the world. Indeed, of the 490 resolutions 
adopted in this period 230 of them had focused on the MENA region, accounting for over 
45% of the Council’s business.1 This region is, as Hinnebusch, noted, the “epicentre of world 
crisis”.2 Instability in the area has increased the thirst for power, both as a shield and as a 
means for intervention. Power in the Middle East and North Africa subsystem, however – in 
terms of conditions of its accumulation, the manner of its accumulation, its disbursement, 
and also its decline – remains fluid and it is this fluidity which ensures that no one state can 
feel comfortable to let its power and influence drift. Power, seen here as the collection of 
ideas, tools and resources to effect change, and conversely to protect the status quo, is 
arguably the key essential ingredient of survival in such a hostile, dynamic and competitive 
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subsystem as the MENA. Further, power – that is to say exercise of it – is no longer a 
monopoly of the bigger regional actors. In this subsystem power is unevenly divided and 
small states, particularly those endowed with a combination of liquid (cash) resources and 
ambitious leaders can bring pressure to bear on others.3 Such states have even played a 
decisive role in the dynamics of change in the region – as has been shown in Qatari and 
Emirati interventions in Libya and Syria, Emirati intervention in Yemen, and exercise of 
Qatari and Emirati soft power in Egypt and Afghanistan. Power’s fluidity is a driver of 
instability in this subsystem, which tests the capabilities of its state actors, and encourages, 
as a consequence, the inflow of non-state and sub-state actors to challenge state authority. 
Such interventions are more intense whenever and wherever a central government’s grip 
appears weak or loosening. States, in response, have to appear strong, thus leading to their 
own deeper securitization as well as that of the environment in which they operate. 
It is, therefore, arguably the context – the strategic environment – shaped through history 
and regional struggles which impact state behaviour in the MENA region. In the words of 
Paul Noble, foreign policy is partly determined “by the global and regional environments in 
which they operate”.4 It is less clear cut, however, that “systemic conditions” necessarily 
“shape” state behaviour, as Noble claims. Systemic conditions act a set of opportunities and 
constraints as well as a lever to pressure each state’s direction of policy. System-level 
analysis does not suggest that the domestic conditions do not have a determining influence; 
far from it, policies and worldviews take shape at home and it is only through a process of 
distillation and power exchanges that they become tools in the hands of executive elites.  As 
elites circulate, as in the case of Saudi Arabia since 2015, they bring with them new policy 
agendas and approaches to dealing with their respective strategic dilemmas. We can see in 
Arab monarchies such as Saudi Arabia that the worldviews of emerging dominant individuals 
and cliques, even in countries ruled and governed continuously by members of the same 
established elite, leave an indelible footprint on the policy outputs of the state. 
The strategic environment in the MENA region is shaped by a combination of local 
(communal), national, interstate, and international forces and it is in the interactions 
between these unequal players that policy emerges. As noted above, the MENA regional 
system stands out as one of the most penetrated in the international system, and perhaps 
as a consequence of this it has been unable to create strong and cohesive regional 
institutions. Such inter-governmental organizations as the Arab League and the Arab 
Maghreb Union are in effect moribund, and many earlier groupings (such as the Arab 
Cooperation Council and the United Arab Republic) long ago disappeared without a trace. 
Indeed in the midst of a general crisis in the region today its one durable regional 
organization, the Gulf Cooperation Council, is also apparently tearing itself apart. Whether 
due to Saudi lack of faith in its continuing utility as a security shield or intense competition 
with Qatar on the regional stage, the GCC’s troubled state merely underlies the fragility of 
inter-governmental organizations in a region fraught with tension and rivalry. Competitive 
pressure from within the system and applied pressure from the outside of the system make 
cooperative politics very difficult to manage in the MENA region, and thus enhance the 
sense of anarchy as a conditioning factor in relations. Regional conditions have also been 
adversely affected, it must be added, by the Arab region’s crisis of identity, its intense 
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communal and inter-state crises, and the deep rivalries amongst competing non-Arab states 
playing out on Arab turf. The subsystem’s non-Arab actors (Iran, Israel, and Turkey) have 
brought their own unique pressures to bear, and where they have found themselves in 
direct confrontation with each other, they have played these out in Arab lands.  
The interplay between external powers and regional actors has tended to internationalize 
the region’s myriad of crises quickly and thus sucked international actors into its multitude 
of conflict zones. Since the 1956 Suez crisis, through to the two major Arab-Israeli wars of 
1967 and 1973, the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, the three wars in the Persian Gulf sub-
region since 1980, and the Afghan state crisis since 1979, major powers and international 
bodies have been sucked in as warriors or peacemakers, and more often than not as both. 
Just in the period since the Arab uprisings, external powers have been involved in military 
action in Iraq, Libya, Syria and Yemen, and as mediators in Afghanistan, the Gulf, Lebanon, 
the Sudan, Somalia, and of course in the Arab-Israeli theatre.  Intense regional rivalries feed 
regional insecurity and fuel competition between states and their coopted state and non-
state allies. Iranian-Saudi tensions, which have deepened since the 2003 Iraq war, and 
worsened with the JCPoA and then the Arab uprisings which torn the fabric of the Arab 
order apart and placed Iran and Saudi Arabia squarely in front of each other, exemplify this 
trend. 
Foreign policy context 
In a levels of analysis-type approach one can identify the key drivers of policy changes in the 
Kingdom as it considers the transformations taking place around it, and puts these in the 
broader context of its regional-level interests and international-level aspirations. Complex 
realism helps us better understand Saudi foreign policy making and the ways in which it has 
responded to regional crises and international tensions.5 Under this framework, one can 
assume that MENA policymakers are quintessential realists but whose environment is 
immeasurably more complicated, fluid and dynamic than realism anticipates. In this 
approach the weight of power and threat relations in shaping thinking is readily 
acknowledged, but this perspective argues that the realist approach does not adequately 
recognize how policy emerges. This blind spot means that realism misses policy 
‘construction’ in the hands of elites and the ways in which elite circulation can affect 
interest formation and policy decisions. To get a handle on policy choices and derived 
decisions, therefore, we must unlatch the ‘block box’ of policy making to see how policy is 
negotiated, drafted and implemented. State policies will of course have a degree of 
rationality built into them but this is not to say that a rational actor model prevails. The idea 
of rationality, therefore, is thus only from the perspective of state actors themselves, whose 
worldviews and role conceptions are shaped by historically-specific experiences and a wide 
range of at times competing domestic considerations. So, regional context only accounts for 
the conditions of decisions; the other part of the equation is the role of the national 
leadership, and it is here that we can observe significant changes in Saudi Arabia.6 
Domestic level:  The focus on leadership is significant in this context, for, as has been argued 
elsewhere, in “regimes in which power is personalized and concentrated, and especially in 
times of fluidity or crisis, the leader’s personal style, values, perceptions, and 
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misperceptions can make an enormous difference”.7 The changing of the guard, from King 
Abdullah bin Abdulaziz to King Salman bin Abdulaziz in January 2015 has proved to be 
transformative. Shortly after taking power King Salman initiated a series of personnel 
changes at the highest level of governance whose key decision to name his son, Mohammed 
bin Salman (MbS), as crown prince in June 2017, has proved to be the most important. 
Using constructivist tools, it is possible to show that MbS has brought his interpretation of 
what Nonneman refers to as ‘meanings of facts and objects’ to bear on the Saudi foreign 
policy.8  The Crown Prince, in this sense, is internalizing as state policy his sense of the 
domestic and external environments in which the regime operates. Furthermore, as he 
strives to change the political economy of Saudi Arabia so he is also reconfiguring the 
Kingdom’s identity and self-perception. He is a self-proclaimed modernizer who sees the 
future through the lens of rapid economic progress and loosening of sociocultural 
constraints. So when the Crown Prince encourages female participation in the social, 
economic and political life of the country he is arguably pushing for the renegotiation of the 
role gender relations in the country; by the same token when the government removes the 
barriers to women driving, it is profoundly altering female access to the world beyond home 
and the workplace. In this regard, reforms affecting female participation in society will 
considerably raise Saudi women’s participation in the labour market from its current low 
level of just 20%. Women are needed as engines of change and by the end of the Vision 
2030 strategy women could have added a further $90 billion to the Kingdom’s economic 
output.9 To change the country’s economy, the Salman order is renegotiating the whole 
social contract, reducing the lavish welfare state, and introducing taxes. These are essential 
reforms for pushing the Kingdom away from its lingering rentier hangovers; in doing so it is 
also placing a much greater weight on the shoulders of Saudi nationals. With high youth 
unemployment and low productivity, the Kingdom needs to train its future workforce, 
present it with the opportunities for gainful employment and ensure that their lives are 
better than the ‘oil boomers’ generation, if it is to weather the economic problems ahead. 
Mobilization of the nationals, however, will have to be balanced against their 
empowerment if the somewhat smaller al-Saud ruling base is to manage the transition to a 
‘knowledge’ economy and post-oil industrial power.  
These are not easy undertakings. In the absence of quick gains and systematic liberalization 
of social norms, the apparent attack by MbS on the conservative religious establishment 
could potentially generate a major backlash, for example, which could derail the whole 
Vision 2030 project. Without meaningful political liberalization, furthermore, change can 
only be limited. But how can the Saudi system be liberalized and not echo the concerns of 
the ulama who have been loyal allies of the al-Sauds for a hundred years? How can it 
renegotiate the Saudi version of Islam with the ulama and maintain the al-Saud order’s core 
legitimacy intact?  
As we have seen, radical Islamists can act against the state’s interests with ease and their 
actions can hurt the Kingdom. Blow back from their Wahhabi and Salafist adventurism, for 
example, was swift following 9/11, as the West began to put systematic pressure on the 
Kingdom to ‘reform’ its culture and educational system to reign in support for Osama bin 
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Laden and his al-Qaeda movement. On the eve of the Islamic State’s growing power in 2014, 
moreover, some 2,500 Saudi nationals were already fighting for the IS group and IS was 
threatening the Kingdom with bomb blasts and assassination plots. Thus, the need to fight 
the brewing domestic threat is omnipresent.  
The internal changes and dramatic policy initiatives since 2015 speak of a strong Saudi 
desire to reduce its direct dependency on external powers, which had been the enduring 
feature of its foreign policy until 9/11. In reality, however, since 2017 the Kingdom has been 
quick to restore its close relations with the United States under the Trump administration 
and revitalize its close military and intelligence ties with the United States. In order to 
achieve its regional objectives against Iran and to assert itself as the dominant Arab power, 
Riyadh has willingly (re)attached its wagon to that of the United States in the region, but 
whether it had really distanced itself from its most powerful and reliable backer remains in 
question. It, arguably, never loosened the critical life-support ties with Washington.  
The Kingdom has, at the same time, set about building closer and closer partnerships with 
China, the European Union, India, and also Russia. With virtually all of these parties, energy 
drives Saudi policy, which remains a hard power tool in the Kingdom’s toolkit. As a 
consequence of its outreach strategy, thus, Saudi Arabia has dared to go beyond the United 
States and build partnerships with other global actors, which has made the Kingdom one of 
the best networked countries in the world, and its voice is heard, and its presence felt in 
many parts of the world. Much of this networking is of course in the interest of building up 
the country and securing Saudi Arabia itself.  
The Crown Prince, having stepped over Prince Mohammed bin Nayef as Crown Prince, is 
now all-powerful in the Kingdom’s small core. Also holding the posts of First Deputy Prime 
Minister, Defence Minister, and Chairman of the Council for Economic and Development 
Affairs, has enabled him to secure access to the most important levers of governance and 
has made it possible for him to exercise tremendous power and influence.10 Such 
concentration of power in the Kingdom is unprecedented and the fact that the Crown Prince 
has squeezed all competing princes out of the traditionally close al-Saud governing circles is 
challenging the established rules of the game in the Kingdom: “he can do whatever he 
wants now. All the checks and balances are gone”, noted a prominent Saudi commentator 
with close links to the family.11 More unsettling has been the action he took in November 
2017 to incarcerate dozens of his powerful cousins and their elite allies on charges of 
corruption and abuse of public funds. This act did not only alienate many of his powerful 
cousins but has undone the consensus-based Saudi approach to decision making. It was not 
lost on close observers of the Kingdom that the regime cannot speak of the need for the 
rule of law to prevail and then lock up, without any trial or public discussion, some of the 
country’s most influential men on charges of corruption or abuse of position.  
On the all-important economic front, critical transformative change has been occurring 
under Mohammad bin Salman who has made it his mission to change the Kingdom’s 
political economy by reducing the economy’s dependence on external oil revenues. This is 
critically important going forward as Saudi Arabia is worryingly watching the formation of a 
perfect energy storm against it. There is, on the one hand, the rise of the United States as an 
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exporter of oil and liquefied natural gas (LNG), rapidly reaching Saudi Arabia’s markets in 
Europe and Asia.12 On the other, Iran and Qatar are raising their natural gas export 
capacities substantially in response to the global climate change rules which will require 
massive reductions on the use of crude oil as a source of energy, with crude oil exports 
being Saudi Arabia’s lifeline. For some analysists, Saudi warmth towards the United States 
and measured hostility towards Iran and Qatar can also be explained through the lens of the 
rapidly-changing global energy markets in which the Kingdom will need the muscle of its 
American energy competitor to subdue the competition from its close neighbours. Closer 
proximity to China and India, also, are designed to secure for the Kingdom medium to long 
term markets in Asia, certainly until such a time as it can afford to look at the horizon 
beyond oil exports as its lifeline.  
Regional level: As already noted, foreign policy in the MENA region is a product of complex 
interactions between internal forces and national priorities in which regional developments 
provide the backdrop, strategic context if you will, for policy formulation. It is arguably the 
rapidly changing, deteriorating, regional environment, which provides the context for the 
perceptible changes in the Kingdom’s foreign policy and regional behaviour.13 The MENA 
subsystem has shaped Saudi Arabia and its policies, with Islam (identity), energy (economy), 
and security providing the three dimensions of its concerns.  
Analysts of Saudi Arabia used to depict the Kingdom’s default foreign policy as a form of 
passive engagement, timid in its relationships, reactive and non-confrontational. Saudi 
Arabia started out as cautious regional actor.14 The dominant view was that the “traditional 
Saudi foreign policy since King Faisal has been reactive and cautious. The kingdom was risk 
averse. National security policy was often done by clandestine means; force was 
avoided. Kings were decisive but careful not to overextend their capacity”.15 Saudi Arabia’s 
vulnerabilities to global oil market fluctuations, persistent geopolitical pressures, and the 
ever-present assertive regional actors on its doorstep – from Nasser’s Egypt, to Iraq’s 
Saddam Hussein and Iran’s Ayatollahs – had raised since the 1950s the Kingdom’s reliance 
on Western powers and its acute dependence on the United States as the country’s security 
backstop, its security guarantor. The 1970s is the period in which Saudi Arabia became more 
engaged regionally, helped by the introduction of the Nixon Doctrine-based ‘two pillar’ 
Persian Gulf policy in the aftermath of Britain’s military disengagement from territories ‘east 
of Suez’ in 1971. This arguably created the close petro-military relationship with the United 
States, which has directly influenced Saudi Arabia’s regional policies.16 Bandwagoning with 
the United States served Saudi interests well and delayed the need for it to balance against 
its regional adversaries, but this was not then to depict the Kingdom as a passive regional 
actor. 
Saudi Arabia has arguably been an active regional player since the 1950s. In the 1960s, the 
most dramatic decade of inter-Arab ideological struggles, its role in containing the spread of 
the Arab nationalist wave pitted it directly against Egypt and its allies in the region, a 
struggle which Saudi Arabia arguably won.17 It also reached out to Islamist forces 
confronting Nasser’s secular nationalist agenda and formed a bond with the Nasser’s key 
opponents in the Muslim Brotherhood and in the Muslim World League. Its voice, 
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moreover, as the home of Islam, has presented it with soft power and cultural influence 
across the Muslim world since the collapse of the Ottoman empire in early twentieth 
century. This soft power the Kingdom has used to great effect since the late 1970s to garner 
support for itself and to cultivate local forces in many parts of the Muslim world – in 
southeast Asia, Central Asia, sub-Sahara Africa and even amongst Muslim communities in 
China, Europe and North America. It has also used very effectively the Organization of 
Islamic Conference as a foreign policy tool, whether against the Soviets in Afghanistan, 
against Israel’s occupation of Arab lands, and more recently against Iran. Indeed, the 
promotion of Wahhabism had been a trait of the Kingdom’s external posture throughout 
the post-1945 period and featured heavily in Riyadh’s proxy war with President Nasser of 
Egypt in Yemen and elsewhere. Wahhabism export grew most dramatically following the 
Iranian revolution and the West’s campaign to defeat the Soviets in Afghanistan following 
their invasion of the Muslim neighbour in 1979. For the Kingdom not only was this a just 
cause, holy jihad to defend Muslims from un-Godly communists, but also to compete with 
Iran’s Shia revolutionary brand. By 1989, Saudi Arabia had created an army of battle-
hardened jihadists who readily turned on the hand that had fed them for 10 years when 
Riyadh invited Western military forces on its soil to help reverse Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 
1990. Bin Laden and al-Qaeda grew from the ranks of the same disgruntled jihadists who 
saw in the US a greater enemy than the Soviet Union. Saudi statecraft was also in evidence 
in 1981 when it forged the creation of the Gulf Cooperation Council as an all-Arab and Gulf 
Arab monarchy defence pact, and again for the active role it played in garnering regional 
and international support for Iraq’s military campaign against Iran. 
MENA regional instability then is not a new phenomenon and the Arab order, at the heart of 
the regional system, has arguably been eroding since the breakdown of Arab consensus 
leading up to the 1973 Arab-Israeli war following Egypt’s unilateral peace treaty with Israel 
in 1979. Egypt’s apparent abandonment of the core Arab cause created a major crack in the 
Arab order and not only left the Arab monarchies, President Anwar al-Sadat’s main Arab 
allies, adrift but created new tensions between them and the so-called ‘rejectionists’ 
(notably Algeria, Iraq, Libya, Sudan, Syria, and the PLO). The inter-state tensions following 
Camp David was compounded by the overthrow of the Pahlavi monarchy in Iran in the same 
year and the emergence of the MENA region’s first Islamist revolutionary regime. This was 
another blow to the Arab monarchies but the revolution also deepened the intra-Ba’athist 
rivalry between Baghdad and Damascus. While Syria tied itself closely to the new Iranian 
regime, Iraq drew close to the Arab monarchies and mobilized its forces to confront the 
Shia-led regime in Tehran, which had already displayed aggressive intent towards Iraq and 
the Gulf’s Arab monarchies. Thus, regional conditions have been deteriorating since the late 
1970s and regional states have been adjusting their policies in response to this. What is 
perhaps more significant is the fact that in a relatively short space of time, and as a result of 
particular developments in the region, what appeared as fractures gave way to 
fragmentation, which led to eventual polarization. Polarization, in the absence of supportive 
regional structures, has caused a paralysis in the Arab regional framework and mounting 
regional crises have atomized the Arab order and encouraged competition between the 
stronger regional states. These conditions have been both an opportunity and a problem for 
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the Kingdom. Fragmentation certainly weakened the Arab base on which it had traditionally 
relied, but it also gave Riyadh the opportunity to push itself to the forefront of regional 
politics and bid for Arab leadership following the demise or mortally weakened formerly 
powerful regimes in Egypt, Iraq, Libya, and Syria in the 2003-2012 period.   
For all its growing voice in the 1970s, however, and perhaps because of it, Saudi Arabia 
became a prime victim of the regional developments at that time.18 Gause describes 
Riyadh’s strategic dilemmas of the time rather well, in writing: “The United States… pushed 
Riyadh to support Egypt and the new [Egypt-Israel peace] treaty. Iraq and Syria, leading a 
solid Arab bloc, urged the Saudis to join them in cutting ties to Egypt and opposing the 
treaty. Meanwhile, the Iranian revolution had stirred up Islamic political activity throughout 
the region, including in Saudi Arabia itself”.19 These were overwhelming strategic pressures 
which put Riyadh in an impossible situation. Saudi Arabia could not abandon its principles of 
Muslim solidarity (against Israeli occupation) and Arab unity for expediency and therefore 
decided to cut loose its ties with its close ally, Sadat’s Egypt, but it also resisted running to 
the embrace of Baghdad and Damascus.  Balancing was the Kingdom’s classic reaction to the 
crisis. Before the year was out, however, the Iran-Iraq war became a new and immediate 
cause of distress requiring extensive diplomatic and political engagement in support of Iraq. 
The war, however, also provided the first sign of the Kingdom being ready to use its armed 
forces in anger, as it did with its brand new air force against Iran in 1984.20 This episode 
provided the first piece of evidence that the Kingdom was not frightened of taking military 
action in the face of Iranian pressure and, albeit with American assistance, was prepared to 
act as equal power in the post-twin pillar Persian Gulf environment. A strong military, 
spectrum American support, and brandishing of its sophisticated armour formed the legacy 
of a highly securitized Persian Gulf subregion at the heart of the Kingdom’s foreign policy 
concerns.  
Riyadh had arguably been emboldened under the Reagan administration to act in defence 
of its own immediate interests and to intervene in regional affairs where necessary. Action 
in its own defence also included covert contacts with China and the secret purchasing of 
intermediate-range surface-to-surface ballistic missiles from China in 1988: “a weapon 
powerful enough to deter any potential enemy from attacking us”.21 Despite American 
pressure, the Kingdom proceeded to operationalize its ‘East Wind’ (Chinese designation DF-
3A) missiles batteries and created a Strategic Missile Force command to manage this force. 
This acquisition, argues Prince Khaled bin Sultan bin Abdulaziz, “represented a turning point 
in Saudi Arabia’s defence strategy and must be placed in the context of proliferation missile 
systems [in the region] and reflected the Kingdom’s growing responsibilities in the Middle 
East, in the Muslim world as a whole, and on the world stage”.22 A self-aware Saudi Arabia 
had arrived, whose geopolitical and geo-cultural position in the region came to test barely 
two years after the end of the Iran-Iraq war. 
In Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990, the Kingdom was thrusted to centre stage as the anti-
Iraq alliance’s main base and the front in the 1991 war for the liberation of Kuwait. Saudi 
armour and military force was extensively used in the campaign and Saudi Arabia learned to 
sharpen its diplomatic tools further in its efforts to create a credible Arab and Muslim 
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coalition against Iraq.23 In negotiations with the West over the future of the region following 
the war, and to deter other parties from mobilizing in Baghdad’s defence, Riyadh became 
the crossroads of diplomatic exchanges.24 The short duration and success of that campaign 
added to the Kingdom’s regional weight, and its standing was further elevated when it 
emerged as the joint-broker, with the United States, of the collective Arab diplomatic 
solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. What had been launched as the Fahd Plan in 1981, 
evolved in the Arab blueprint for regional peace.   
So, since 1979 the Kingdom had arguably been in a crisis management mode more or less 
continuously and in the following decade not only did it manage to create the Arab region’s 
most sophisticated military machine but also established itself as the region’s most 
influential voice on the international stage. It had the financial means to act internationally 
as well as the support from its Western partners to assert itself regionally.  
But regional conditions changed dramatically, indeed worsened from the Saudi perspective, 
in 2003 as the war to remove Saddam Hussein unleashed a chain of events which 
dramatically improved the prospects of its regional rival, Iran. This war, arguably, was the 
harbinger of major change in Saudi behaviour, for America’s war in Iraq compromised much 
of Saudi Arabia’s security calculus, dramatically changing as it did the regional landscape and 
the Arab balance of power. Destruction of the Sunni-dominated Ba’ath ruling establishment 
in Iraq resulted in Saudi Arabia losing the one Gulf country able to act as balancer of Iran.25 
Deepening Saudi fears of a resurgent Iran, now able to threaten Saudi interests directly can 
be traced to this episode, in which post-Saddam Iraq became the playground of Iranian 
revolutionaries. This war, fought against the advice of US’ Arab allies, forced the Kingdom to 
chart a new pathway for its regional role as the defender of Sunni-Arab countries and 
communities, and in taking up the mantle of the defender of the Arab order. Iraq, in the 
Saudi view, had been handed over to Iran by the Bush administration and the ensuing 
strategic change in the regional balance of power would come to amplify Saudi 
vulnerabilities and concerns of an embolden Tehran now able to act more unhindered in the 
wider region. Iran was no longer ‘contained’ and its presence in Iraq would give it strategic 
depth for its national security, as well as the platform to extend its influence in this divided 
country, facilitate access to its close allies in Syria and Lebanon, and of course give it a 
greater presence at the heart of the Arab order in the Levant. Since then, fear of a rampant 
‘Shia crescent’ dominated by Iran provided the strategic backdrop to Saudi regional 
posturing and alliance building. 
Role of Islam too has changed and has gone through a step change in the 2010s, bringing 
the Kingdom into line with its Western allies. Its contribution of $100 million in August 2017 
to the UN’s Counter-terrorism Centre was meant to consolidate Riyadh’s position as a 
member of the international anti-terror coalition. Such gestures did not however herald an 
end to Riyadh’s support for, or promotion of Salafi forces and ideas across the Muslim 
world. In the age of identity rivalries mapped onto state competition, Saudi version of Islam 
remains a powerful tool in countering Iran’s Shia-led march across the region. 
At the international level, change has been taking place in two ways. First, the Kingdom’s 
own place has changed dramatically, building on its role as the cradle of Islam, and more 
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emphatically because of its role as OPEC’s ‘swing producer’ of oil which has given it 
considerable influence in determining the direction of oil prices and also because of its 
considerable financial power. Saudi Arabia’s integration into the global capitalist system set 
the Kingdom apart from the other primary commodity producers and the sheer weight of its 
oil power created a condition of what Gause characterizes as ‘asymmetric interdependence’ 
rather than dependence.26 Since the 1970s its petrodollars have helped it open doors in the 
West, create a mighty military machine, and build economic bridges westwards and 
eastwards. Its economic prowess has been recognized by its membership of the G20 top 
economies of the world. As it has migrated upwards in the global economic system so the 
Kingdom has also become more sensitive to global currents, and while interacting with 
global leaders it has been able to cultivate new economic and diplomatic relationships.  
Secondly, the Kingdom’s global relations have become more complex and Saudi Arabia’s 
first real negative experience on the world stage came after 9/11, which pointed the dial of 
global terrorism towards the Kingdom. This catastrophic incident, led by a group of Saudi 
militants, has arguably left a deep mark on Riyadh’s role conception. The spotlight on its 
society and religious practices caused the Kingdom’s elite some discomfort and forced it to 
justify its international conduct for the first time. While accepting to introduce changes to 
its school curriculum and religious education, it also went on the offensive to show the 
Kingdom’s important role in the international system. This marked the first phase of Riyadh 
coming out of its protective shell. It was, arguably, fear of losing the American security cover 
following 9/11 which provided the key catalyst for Saudi pro-activism. While President Bush 
went out of his way following the Iraq war to court the Saudis and proceeded to grease the 
wheel of diplomacy with massive arms sales to the Kingdom, the real crisis in the alliance 
appeared during President Obama’s presidency. In this period, America’s arms-length 
attitude towards its Arab allies reeling under the pressure of Arab protests pushed the 
monarchies in particular to play a more central role in the region. Saudi Arabia, playing 
catch up with its smaller neighbours, accelerated its involvement following the fall of the 
Muslim Brotherhood-led government of Mohamed Morsi in Egypt in 2013 and the 
militarization of the Syrian conflict in the same year. As regional security conditions 
deteriorated, Riyadh led the counter-revolutionary campaign in the Arab region. It, on the 
one hand, financially and militarily supporting the beleaguered al-Khalifa elite in Bahrain 
and financially cushioning the Egyptian economy to aid General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi of Egypt, 
took up arms against Houthi rebels in Yemen, and supported a plethora of Islamist groups 
against the Assad regime in Syria, on the other.   
As the MENA subsystem has been penetrated by external (international) powers, so they 
have inevitably come to play a significantly greater role in shaping the behaviour of local 
actors.27 The end of the Cold War in 1989 has not only not diminished external interventions 
but as a result of the regional system’s fragility and instability, has in many respects, 
intensified the involvement of the great and major powers.28  
So, when such a great power as the United States chooses to ‘lead from behind’ in the 
region (as it did during President Obama’s second term in office) it still has to ensure that its 
regional alliances are catered for and so compensates for its unexpected acts by a rush of 
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military hardware to the apparently more vulnerable such allies.29 President Obama’s peace 
overtures to Iran from 2012 and offer of a nuclear deal to reduce the international sanctions 
regime on the Islamic Republic merely deepened Saudi fears. American balancing was seen 
as abandonment and a tilt towards the regional rival.30 Coming on the back of the region-
wide security storms caused by the Arab uprisings in the region, it was the secret initiative, 
conducted through the good offices of Saudi Arabia’s GCC partner, Oman, to reach a nuclear 
détente with the Islamic Republic which finally ended Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy reticence 
and unleashed the Kingdom’s aspiration to become the Arab region’s dominant power. 
Petrodollars and oil exports dominance were squarely in the service of building a militarily 
strong and politically masculine regional actor, to become a fully-fledged MENA middle 
power.31  
The United States’ real or perceived ‘disengagement’ strategy did generate policy dilemmas 
for local powers, and for such competing regional powers as Iran and Saudi Arabia 
anticipation of a weak United States proved to be a decisive factor in their calculations: 
Driving Tehran to consolidate its regional position and Riyadh to develop a more aggressive 
and independent foreign policy posture. In the Trump era, the US role has again changed 
and despite its declared aim of disengaging from the troubled Middle East, its policies – 
whether unpicking President Obama’s nuclear deal, disengaging from Syria in favour of the 
Bashar status quo, reengaging more fully with Saudi Arabia, or shifting the balance of power 
in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict in favour of Israel – and actions are further destabilizing the 
already fragile inter-state relations in the region. But the Trump administration’s 
unquestioning support for Riyadh has encouraged the Salmans to be even more bold and 
adventurous, which can be seen in relation to the Kingdom’s devastating war against the 
Houthis in Yemen, and in its hostile attempt to create an Arab coalition of four (with 
Bahrain, Egypt and the UAE) against neighbouring Qatar whose foreign policy has been 
strongly questioned. 
Saudi Arabia as a resurgent middle power 
Tim Niblock had observed in 2006 that the Kingdom faced a three-pronged problem 
urgently needing structural remedies if the country was to prosper. The three problems as 
Niblock saw them were, “how to make Saudi labour competitive internationally and reduce 
the need for migrant labour, how to maintain regime security and national security…, and 
how to bring within the system some of the groupings currently alienated from it”.32 The 
Salmans, arguably, have accepted the challenge and in their drive to deliver their Vison 2030 
and giving women and wider society more breathing space, are trying to address the first 
core problem. Saudization, however, means forcing the Saudi workforce to work in the 
private sector and the latter employing them, cutting subsidies and privileges, and making 
them ‘more competitive’. This is a risky business in a country whose population has been 
become addicted to rentier customs and in which labour practices remain opaque and 
monetarization of work unclear. Thus, the question needs to be raised if the regime is able 
to successfully transform Saudi Arabia’s population from the status of subjects into citizens, 
and therefore stakeholders, without incurring a heavy political cost.  
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Also, It is also far from clear how MbS’ unsubtle war on the al-Saud elite, who have been an 
organic part of the al-Saud ruling class, can reduce alienation. Through their economic and 
political strategies, the Salmans appear to be destabilizing the two important pillars of al-
Saud power. 
In the light of the above, the Crown Prince’s execution of the Kingdom’s new policies would 
appear rather problematic, and this brings us back to the economic core of the reforms 
engulfing the Kingdom. The Salman duo seem to be caught between the necessity of 
restructuring the economy away from oil and at the same time desperately needing oil 
income to plug the country’s budgetary problems. But this is a hard task while they are also 
financing the very expensive war in Yemen,33 financially supporting Egypt and Bahrain and 
Sunni communities in Lebanon, providing backing for Pakistan, financing Tehran’s 
opponents, as well as keeping citizens at home happy.  
Since the Kingdom hit the world stage in 1973 with its high-value petrodollars and greater 
voice in Arab circles (which included its leading role in the oil embargo against the West), 
speculation about its wider role have remained. Saudi Arabia had been an Arab actor of 
note in its own right for half a century, but from the early 1970s it clearly took the necessary 
steps towards becoming a regional power. However, while in the 1980s and 1990s it did not 
have the full military, demographic and strategic trimmings of a middle power, it has since 
the 2000s been making every effort to compensate for these components of assertive 
power through a more aggressive diplomatic posture. So, even when it finally got the 
support to join the highest inter-state security forum in the world, it refused to take up its 
United Nations Security Council seat in October 2013 in protest for Security Council failure 
to “carry its duties and responsibilities” in Syria and over use and pursuit of WMDs by 
regional countries.34 Its protest was meaningful while it saved the Kingdom from having to 
join the Council and compromise its principles or expose its weaknesses. Arguably only a 
confident power could take such a bold step. 
It is evident that winds of change have been blowing in the Kingdom for some time, and just 
as the late “King Abdullah provide[d] an excellent case study of both the impact of a change 
of leadership and how to handle old problems in innovative ways”, so does arguably his 
successor.35 In this new ear, however, the architect of the Kingdom’s new foreign policy is in 
danger of spreading the regime too thin for it to be able to meet its multiple objectives and 
to successfully manage the domestic and regional challenges facing it. First amongst these is 
the stated goal of defeating what the Crown Prince has referred to as the ‘triangle of evil’ 
(Iran, the Muslim Brotherhood, and jihadists in al-Qaeda, IS, etc.).36 We can surmise that the 
Saudis will aim to defeat the Brotherhood by working closely with Egypt and the UAE, will 
confront terror groups by being part of an international coalition, and try and push Iran back 
by working more closely with the United States and coordinating with Washington’s trusted 
regional allies (namely Israel). To defeat the ‘triangle of evil’ is no easy task and to beat 
‘terror groups’ will require the Kingdom facing the demon of jihadism at home; while trying 
to roll back Iranian influence will require a stable base at home to ensure that Tehran 
cannot use its long arm to shake the foundations of the Kingdom. To deal with Iran, and 
what MbS has called the expansionist ‘Hitler’ of the Middle East, he has promised to take 
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the fight to Iran itself and to challenge its presence in neighbouring Arab countries – Iraq, 
Lebanon, Sudan, Syria, Yemen – directly. In this exercise, the Saudis have reached out to 
other groups and countries and in Iraq for example have cultivated the Shia cleric Moqtada 
al-Sadr as a potential ally against Iran. Much of this grand scheme requires control of the 
GCC states as Saudi Arabia’s first line of defence, but as we have seen since the summer of 
2017 the GCC’s state bonds have been shaken by the direct Saudi-led alliance of Bahrain, 
Egypt and the UAE who launched a direct assault on Qatar. The GCC is today a fractured 
regional organization, if not totally broken, and with the demise of the GCC the Kingdom’s 
first circle of defence will have been weakened.  
In Yemen, which is a first tier national security concern, the Saudis have managed to 
alienate local parties and have turned the campaign against what was a non-state tribal 
militia into a protracted costly war with catastrophic humanitarian consequences. As Miller 
and Sokolsky have observed, under the Crown Prince’s direction “the Saudis along with 
some of their Gulf Arab allies have conducted a relentless and brutal air campaign that has 
caused a humanitarian catastrophe, killing thousands of civilians, inflicting massive damage 
on civilian infrastructure and worsening an ongoing famine. The Saudis are stuck in a 
quagmire: Their military campaign, even after doubling down, has failed to dislodge the 
Houthis and their allies from the capital or wrest control of the northern part of the country; 
and they have no viable diplomatic strategy for ending the war. By aiding and abetting the 
Saudis in Yemen, the United States has empowered Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, 
strengthened Iranian influence in Yemen, undermined Saudi security and brought Yemen 
closer to the brink of collapse. The Saudis have driven themselves—and the United States—
into a deep ditch in the country. They need to stop digging to get out”.37 With no clear end 
game in sight and human and material cost of the war rising this can hardly be sees as a 
foreign or defence policy success. So, for the foreseeable future, the Saudis and their closest 
ally in the war (the UAE) will have to maintain a strong and expensive presence in order to 
stabilize this shattered country. Saudi resistance to Kuwaiti mediation efforts to end the 
Yemen war also speak of an increasingly one-dimensional foreign policy approach in which 
diplomacy is trumped in favour of direct action.  
Nor is the crisis with Qatar has been particularly well-handled by the Saudis (and their Abu 
Dhabi allies). The attempts to isolate a brotherly neighbour with whom the Kingdom shares 
a land border, family and tribal, as well as religious ties and practices, has totally disrupted 
the normal flow of GCC interactions. Despite the heavy costs imposed on tiny Qatar, not 
only has it survived but it has managed to thrive by using its abundant financial assets and 
diplomatic networks to compensate for its isolation. Here too, it is Saudi Arabia which is on 
the defensive as Doha has managed to convince the West, notably the United States, of its 
strategic importance and has so successfully traded with the non-Arab neighbours of Iran 
and Turkey that these countries’ fresh and processed produce are now widely available and 
welcomed by the local population. The likely digging of a $1 billion canal (Salwa canal) in 
2018/19 across the desert border between the two countries will be seen by the Qataris as 
the final gesture of divorce from Riyadh and will arguably merely push Doha towards the 
very countries (Iran and Turkey primarily) whose influence in the Arab and closer Gulf region 
the Saudis have been trying to contain. 
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The cajoling by the Trump administration of Saudi Arabia to be more active regionally and to 
take greater responsibility – indeed risk – for containment of Iran and destruction of IS and 
al-Qaeda have further emboldened Riyadh, which – assured of American backing – is more 
aggressively pursuing its new agendas in the region. According to an insider’s account of the 
Trump administration debates about its policy options, the “judgement was that we needed 
to find a change agent. That’s where M.B.S. came in. We were going to embrace him as the 
change agent”.38 Undoing the damage of the ‘Arab Spring’ has been one clear goal of the 
Kingdom since 2011, but the focus of its policies has shifted more dramatically to confront 
Iran on the regional stage and compete with it in Iraq, Lebanon, Yemen, Central and South 
Asia, and of course in Syria. Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s view of Saudi policy is clear: 
“We are pushing back on these Iranian moves. We’ve done this in Africa, Asia, in Malaysia, 
in Sudan, in Iraq, Yemen, Lebanon. We believe that after push back, the problems will move 
inside Iran. We don’t know if the regime will collapse or not – it’s not the target, but if it 
collapses, great, it’s their problem. We have a war scenario in the Middle East right now. 
This is very dangerous for the world. We cannot take the risk here. We have to take serious 
painful decisions now to avoid painful decisions later”. 39 Saudi activism therefore has 
become all-encompassing under the two Salmans, “from attempts to influence politics in 
Iraq to limit the rising influence of Iran, to heavily investing in Lebanon to counter 
Hezbollah’s influence, to working clandestinely and aggressively to organize and support 
opposition to the Bashar Assad regime in Syria. It’s not that Saudi Arabia had not for 
decades used its economic and political influence to affect regional politics; it is that the 
degree to which that was true, including taking initiative and using enormous resources, 
reflected a sense of strategic urgency”.40 Activism can also seem like adventurism.  
The transition from gradualism to rapid action is clear for all to see and the Salmans’ 
domestic policies and regional behaviour point to a process of change which is being 
unleashed on the international stage. The King and his Crown Prince have not shied away 
from tough decisions and have for the first time shown an appetite to put (their 
understanding of) the national interest first. Whether that means a more explicit 
acceptance of Israel, an implicit surrender of Palestinian rights, direct confrontation with 
Iran, or fighting the Kingdom’s real and imagined enemies through the newly-formed 
coalition of the 40-member Islamic Military Counterterrorism Alliance.41 It also has meant a 
more militarized foreign policy and application of pressure on other countries to toe the 
Saudi line.42 It remains to be seen, however, how the Salmans’ aggressive foreign policy can 
enhance national security and improve regime legitimacy in the medium term. 
Saudi Arabia is now an instrumental partner in the birth of a new American-crafted ‘neo-
twin pillar’ regional security order, which may well become a regional security structure if 
the Trump administration extends into a second term, in which responsibility is shared with 
another non-Arab regional power; this time of course it is Israel. The irony of a chief Arab 
state ganging up with the region’s only non-Muslim non-Arab power against the other 
powerful non-Arab Muslim country cannot be ignored here, but the impact such a security 
pact under American tutelage can only worsen regional security dynamics. For the Trump 
administration, this pact is vital and presents itself under the leadership of MbS as the only 
way to recover the vast spaces ‘lost to Iran’: “our anchors were Israel and Saudi Arabia. We 
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can’t be successful [against Iran] in the Gulf without Saudi Arabia”.43 Forty years since the 
demise of the original US-sponsored twin pillar security structure Saudi Arabia appears to be 
the only state in the Persian Gulf with the diplomatic means, the leadership and the political 
will, and the military force to take steps to recast the MENA region to its vision of Arab-
Islamism. The issue, in my view, then is no longer about Saudi Arabia being a middle power, 
for it now certainly acts as one and its greater international presence helps it underwrite its 
greater regional role. What is more important then is the need to understand the policies 
and ambitions of this resurgent power under a new type of leadership. When the Crown 
Prince declares in a public meeting that “I have twenty years to reorient my country and 
launch it into the future”,44 then one realizes that the old rules of the game have been torn 
up and new ones being written just as quickly as the most influential al-Saud in the Kingdom 
can run.45 Rapid transformation at home is occurring at a time of great uncertainty and 
instability abroad in the MENA region, which perhaps adds to the leadership’s sense of 
urgency to make changes at home concrete. All the while that thy do so, they seem to be 
adding uncertainty to the viability of their enterprise, and to fears of more conflicts arising 
from the inherent dangers of the Kingdom’s unbridled foreign policy. 
 
Author: Prof A. Ehteshami is Professor of International Relations and Fellow of University 
College at Durham University. He holds the al-Sabah Chair in International Relations and is 
Director of the al-Sabah Programme and the Institute for Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies 
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